What if the outputs of inimitable resources are not protected but open to imitation? In the tire industry, tire makers' tread patterns, which endow tires with critical functionality, are the output of innovation capabilities. However, this intellectual property was not completely protected from the industry's birth in the early twentieth century through the 1990s. This leads us to the fundamental research question addressed in this paper. Why was this valuable innovation not protected in full for almost a century? Why did firms finally begin to protect it in the 1990s? To answer this question, we examine the history of the global tire industry and its patent trajectory.
Introduction
What if the outputs of inimitable resources are not protected but open to imitation? In the tire industry, tire makers' tread patterns, which endow tires with critical functionality, are the output of innovation capabilities. However, this intellectual property was not completely protected from the industry's birth in the early twentieth century through the 1990s. This leads us to the fundamental research question addressed in this paper. Why was this valuable innovation not protected in full for almost a century? Why did firms finally begin to protect it in the 1990s?
To answer this question, we examine the history of the global tire industry and its patent trajectory.
The global tire industry was extremely stable for much of the twentieth century. Four of the five largest tire makers in the world in 1971 (West, 1984) were the top four players in the global tire industry in 1910. The incremental advancement of product quality along with the development of mass production technology since 1920 sustained the steady domination of large tire makers for more than 60 years (French, 1991; Jovanovic and MacDonald, 1994) . However, by the 1960s, new entrants from Japan began challenging the dominance of American and European multinational enterprises (MNEs). Over the next twenty years, these entrants altered the profile of the industry, culminating in radical consolidation in the late 1980s, wherein several of the established firms were acquired.
Another round of global entry began in the 1980s, this time from South Korea. However, unlike Japan in the 1960s, which was by most measures an advanced economy, South Korea in the 1980s was an economy in the early stages of emergence. 1 We argue that global entry by firms 2 from emerging markets is fundamentally different from the entry of firms from advanced economies. Specifically, whereas advanced economy firms have the capabilities to engage in innovation rivalry soon after entry, emerging market firms have to use imitation as they catch up (Awate et al., 2015) . In this paper, we document the nature of the reactions that this imitative entry triggers from the established MNEs.
Our findings suggest that until the late twentieth century, tread designs, a well-known source of competitive advantage, were not fully protected because imitation of the design would hurt the imitators' other resources such as brand identity. However, the entry of emerging economy players who did not bear these imitation costs dramatically changed the patent trajectory. Advanced players that were directly confronted by the threat of imitation were suddenly forced to strengthen the patent portfolio of their designs to protect their key source of competitive advantage.
This study contributes to the resource-based view (RBV) by showing that some assumptions about consistent investment in inimitability can be relaxed. The RBV as a basis for the competitive advantage of a firm suggests the application of a bundle of valuable tangible or intangible resources at the firm's disposal (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991) . The RBV explains a firm's ability to deliver sustainable competitive advantage when resources are managed so that their outcomes cannot be readily imitated by competitors, which ultimately creates a competitive barrier (Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Smith and Rupp, 2002) . Thus, the investment to secure inimitability seems natural as a strategic choice of firms (Lieberman, 1987; Hill, 1988; Barney, 1991) . However, we highlight here that firms will invest in protecting valuable resources only when there is a threat to inimitability. On the condition that imitation capita GDP in the early 1980s was about one-sixth of comparable contemporaneous figures, indicating that it was an economy in the early stages of emergence.
3 destroys other resources of an imitator, imitation may not occur. If firms recognize this condition in an industry, investment in inimitability may not be necessary. Once the condition is compromised, however, active protection of valuable resources from imitation should be enforced.
Theoretical Background

Inimitability and Isolation Mechanisms
The resource-based view (RBV) contends that the basis for the competitive advantage of a firm lies in the application of a bundle of valuable tangible or intangible resources at the firm's disposal (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991) . Transforming a short-term competitive advantage into a sustained competitive advantage requires that the resources are not perfectly mobile in nature (Peteraf, 1993) . Effectively, the RBV emphasizes that valuable resources should neither be perfectly imitable nor substitutable without great effort (Barney, 1991) . Firms can sustain a strategic position that may result in high profits (Porter, 1980) if they are able to develop and maintain resources and capabilities that cannot be possessed or built up in a similar manner by competitors (Barney, 1991) . Therefore, the consistent investment in inimitability seems like an inevitable choice for firms with valuable resources.
The extant literature shows that the reality of competition challenges firms to secure inimitability consistently. As technological and market uncertainties decrease, firms tend to imitate their competitors' strategic and operational behaviors (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) . This tendency becomes stronger over time, establishing common sources of knowledge and knowhow (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986; Pouder and St. John, 1996) . Along with strong institutional pressure over time, increasingly stronger dependency on similar partners may further cultivate 4 the lack of unique resources and capability (Miller and Chen, 1994) . As firms advance along the experience curve with widely-accepted routines and processes, their competitive advantage suffers because their originally unique resources become common among competitors in the industry (Porter, 1980; Lieberman, 1987; Hill, 1988) . The prevalence of fungible resources and capabilities as an industry ages restricts the breadth and depth of strategic choices (Scherer and Ross, 1990) , resulting in similar business practices and products within an industry (Klepper and Graddy, 1990 ).
The strategic management and innovation literature has identified various isolating mechanisms that help build barriers to imitation (Rumelt, 1984) , including causal ambiguity (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982; Reed and DeFillippi, 1990) , mobility barriers (Caves and Porter, 1977) , inimitable resource positions derived from scale advantages, preferred access to either resources or customers, restrictions on competitors' options (Ghemawat, 1986) , and nontradeable assets such as tacit knowledge and social complexity (Dierickx and Cool, 1989) . A firm may take advantage of secrecy for resources and capability of innovation by establishing special procedures to handle trade secrets if the locus of innovation mainly comes from a type of process (Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, and Winter, 1987) . However, if the core aspect of innovation is easily noticeable, imitable, and/or reengineered, appropriate formal protections such as a patent may serve better for economic rents. Especially in technology-driven industries, where knowledge creation dominates the growth and prosperity of firms, the protection of valuable intangible resources such as intellectual property (IP) is one of the critical options that secure inimitability (Nelson, 1959; Barney, 1991) , possibly leading to a better strategic position (Porter, 1980) . However, even when the protection of competitive IP seems like a logical behavior, investment in inimitability may not always be the norm. If imitation itself is costly (Nelson and 5 Winter, 1982) , the need for proactive protection mechanisms may be low. Imitation may be very costly when customers particularly favor innovators as a criterion for brand selection (Rajan, Volpin, & Zingales, 2000) . In firms from advanced economies, managers tend to view imitation as taboo because imitation may compromise their personal reputations (Bolton, 1993; Shenkar, 2010) . The stigma of being imitators may de-legitimize a firm in an industry and cause the loss of opportunities for institutional benefits (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) . Thus, under the condition that imitation destroys other valuable resources of imitators, innovators do not feel the strong necessity to enforce rigorous isolation mechanisms. The consistent protection of valuable intellectual properties may not necessarily happen.
Changes in Investments in inimitability: Strategic Group Responding to a Threat
In a sense that isolating mechanisms shield individual firms from imitation within a particular strategic group (Kor, 2016) , the condition of loose protection remains as long as the strategic group does not perceive a threat.
As many studies in the strategic management literature tell, the industry itself can contain subgroups with different dynamics of competition (Amel and Rhoades, 1988; Lee, 2003) . Within an industry, a competitor grouping using similar market segments and/or product diversity that differ from those of other industry groups is called a strategic group (Newman, 1978) . A strategic group includes the closest industry competitors given that a significant mobility barrier exists (Porter, 1980) . This nature of a strategic group facilitates the convergence of organizational behavior because "divergent strategies reduce the ability of the oligopolists to coordinate their actions tacitly... reducing average industry profitability" (Porter, 1979) . The 6 members of a strategic group are likely to respond similarly to a risk that threatens the group in order to defend their status quo (Chen and MacMillan, 1992; Chen, Smith, and Grimm, 1992) .
Once a clear threat of imitation in a strategic group of advanced incumbents emerges, the advanced players will ultimately adjust their investments in inimitability in a similar direction.
Since group membership emerges with irrevocable structures based on path dependencies (Peteraf and Shanley, 1997) such as a long-term investment in a specific area of research and development (Caves, 1984) and a historical "commitment by selling the output" of the R&D activities (Lee, 2003) , firms in a threatened group react to defend their innovations in a similar way.
Design as a Source of Competitiveness and its Imitation
The necessity to protect key innovations from imitation culminates in product design.
Effective design can improve the functionality of a product while also serving as visible evidence of enhanced product quality from an advanced R&D capability that in turn creates a significant competitive advantage (Kotler and Rath, 1984; Gemser and Leenders, 2001) . At the same time, design facilitates customers' identification of the maker and brand. For example, the unique shape of a product helps customers recognize "the set of properties of an artifact, consisting of the discrete properties of the form" (Luchs and Swan, 2011) . As a result, product design can work as a key factor of competitiveness (Hertenstein et al., 2005) by providing a visible guide for customers to recognize and choose a specific maker with favored brand identity. In this sense, firms leverage design to communicate the value of their product via its physical appearance (Beebe, 2010) , a critical resource worthy of protection.
On the other hand, the design of a product can be vulnerable to imitation due to its visible nature to competitors. While an effective design is highly valued as an important source of competitiveness (Gemser and Leenders, 2001 ), design itself can be an easy target of imitation if not carefully protected (Filitz and Tether, 2015) . Especially for lagging firms in emerging markets with a weak intellectual property (IP) protection regime, the temptation to copy a valuable IP from industry leaders is real and significant (Brandl, Darendeli, and Mudambi, 2018, Forthcoming) owing to "institutional void" (Khanna and Palepu, 1997) along with cultural disrespect (Bugbee, 1967; Jaffe and Lerner, 2007; Peng, 2013; Robinson, 2016) and a lack of policies that support IP rights (Zimmerman, 2013) . Eventually, their vulnerability to imitation and the high tendency of imitation by emerging market players make advanced market players more concerned about protecting their product design.
In summary, while product design as an effective outcome of advanced R&D capability is widely considered a key factor for competitive advantage (Kotler and Rath, 1984) , it may not necessarily be protected under the condition of high imitation costs caused by other resources at risk by imitation. This implies that the heightened risk of imitation by lagging firms who do not bear imitation costs can create a significant increase in investment in protection of designs by leading innovators that are directly impacted by this risk. We argue that the phenomenon of sudden transition to more design patents in the tire industry well exemplifies this case. To further examine how the threat of imitation drives the protection trend of innovations to a different path,
we conducted a historical analysis of the global tire industry along with a patent analysis of advanced big players and emergent contenders.
Context and Methods
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The empirical context of this research is the global tire industry, which the innovation literature has studied extensively. While the tire industry has not witnessed disruptive technological innovations since the emergence of the radial tire 2 , some mid-tier tire manufacturers have improved their market shares consistently over the past two decades (Fujimura, 2015) . Although the Big 3 players (Bridgestone, Michelin, and Goodyear) still dominate innovation and the market, they collectively lost 17.2% of market share to mid-tier tire makers in the period of 2003 -2014 alone. The consistent inroads of mid-tier tire makers are an interesting divergence from the argument in the extant literature that there is a gradual strengthening of an oligopoly by large incumbents through incremental innovation in a mature industry (Schumpeter, 1942; Klepper and Simons, 2000) . The industry that has been mature and stable for a long time is going through another dynamic era, stirred by the market entry of emerging economy makers, especially from South Korea in the 1990s.
We use two methodologies that complement each other. By unpacking the historical events and longitudinal patent and financial data analysis, we show the shift to more design protections as a response to imitation by makers from emerging economies (Scalera, Mukherjee, Perri, and Mudambi, 2014) . This complementary approach helps us better apprehend the dynamism of imitation and innovation (Casson, 1986 (Casson, , 1997 Wilkins, 1996; Jones and Khanna, 2006; Morck and Yeung, 2007; Buckley, 2009 ).
First, we perform a historical analysis of the tire industry which provides us with background information and the rationales for imitation by emerging economy tire makers. To 9 illustrate the trajectory of IP protection and the nature of imitation in the tire industry, we study the historic events and technological evolution that have shaped the global competition landscape since its early years, with a noticeable change in the trajectory in the tire industry since the 1990s. The rich historical analysis is expected to help elaborate the ins and outs of contextual dynamics (Pettigrew, 1990; Siggelkow, 2007) and illuminate "causal forces of interest" (Joseph and Ocasio, 2012; Scalera, Mukherjee, Perri, and Mudambi, 2014) . The historic events were collected through various sources such as academic manuscripts, books, magazines, press articles, and corporate websites. To triangulate the insights from the historical analysis, a series of expert interviews were performed. Two senior-level executives, two tire sales experts, two strategic planning managers, and two R&D engineers of global tire makers were interviewed to discover the rationales of historical business practices in the industry. We also conducted email interviews with two former executives of Korean automobile makers to augment the historical analysis.
Second, the analysis of the historical dynamics, supporting the findings of seminal studies in the strategic management and international business literatures, is followed by a rigorous analysis of patent and financial data. Analysis based on patent data has been widely used in the literature to diagnose innovation-based competition. Pakes and Griliches (1984) noticed that a firm's "level of economically valuable technological knowledge" can be indicated by the number of patents. Patents can also show the trajectory of protection over time, since firms willingly patent the majority of innovative (patentable) ideas and products (Mansfield, 1986 were collected from the Global CompuStat database.
The Tire Industry before the 1990s: Formation of Oligopoly by Tire Makers from Advanced Economies
After the introduction of pneumatic tires in the 1920s, the tire industry maintained an oligopolistic structure dominated by large innovators. The first fundamental product innovation of balloon-type tires in the 1920s was coupled with consistent process innovation in tiremanufacturing machines for mass production (Rajan, Volpin, and Zingales, 2000) . Continuous increases in product quality and quantity consistently penalized small or new tire makers while strengthening the dominant position of large makers mainly from Europe and the US until the 1970s (French, 1997) . During this period, the longevity of tires increased from 500 miles in the 1910s to 20,000 miles in the 1960s (Jeszeck, 1982) , while the tire price index dropped from 7.7 in the 1910s to 0.9 in the 1970s. Tire production rose from 6 million tires in 1913 to more than 200 million in 1968 (Carree and Thurik, 2000) .
Thanks to a series of product and process innovations, the number of firms in the tire industry dropped, firmly solidifying the market positions of old, big players (Jovanovic and MacDonald, 1994) . By the 1970s, the global tire industry had evolved into a mature oligopoly with a small number of dominant firms, most of which were based in Europe (Michelin, 11 Continental, Pirelli) and the US (Goodyear, Firestone, US Rubber (later Uniroyal), Goodrich, General Tire).
Meanwhile, Japanese tire makers joined the group of global tire leaders. In the 1960s, Japanese tire makers experienced strong growth thanks to "full-fledged motorization, including increased automobiles on the road and the advent of expressways" (The Japan Automobile Tyre Manufacturers Association, 2016). Japanese tire makers such as Bridgestone, Yokohama, and Sumitomo swiftly followed the innovation path of European tire makers by commercializing radial tire technology, which is today's tire standard, and engaged in brand-based competition in the 1950s and 60s (Rajan, Volpin, and Zingales, 2000) . In this sense, the Japanese tire makers competed as leading innovators head-to-head with European makers. Based on the innovations, the Japanese tire industry supplied original equipment (OE) tires on new Japanese cars that were exported to Europe and, later, the US (Rajan, Volpin, and Zingales, 2000) . For instance, Bridgestone and Yokohama entered the US OE market in 1967 and 1969, respectively.
Reluctance to adopt the new radial tire standard was fatal to US tire makers. Goodyear and most US tire makers made a sub-optimal choice by adopting "belted bias ply" technology in the late 1960s (Denoual, 1980; O'Reilly, 1983; Sull, 2001 ) though they recognized the superiority and popularity of radial tires (Kovacs and Rodgers, 1994) . The deviation of the US tire makers from the dominant innovation trend invited detrimental consequences starting in the 1970s. When the demand for radial tires could no longer be ignored, the "radial-lagging" US tire markers experienced major financial troubles. Since radial tires require more costs for labor and materials and different production facilities than bias ply tires (Rubber World, November 1965 cited by Rajan, Volpin, and Zingales, 2000) , immediate, extensive investment in radial tires was not feasible though the need to catch up was very urgent. As a result, unlike European and Japanese makers, major US tire makers were not able to supply the necessary quality and quantity of radial tires to automobile manufacturers (Rajan, Volpin, and Zingales, 2000) .
Ultimately, the global tire industry became even more concentrated with advanced innovators by the late 1980s (Klepper and Simons, 2000) . Through aggressive acquisitions by European and Japanese innovators, old, big US tire makers that had dominated the global tire industry for six decades exited (Ito and Rose, 2002 (Rajan, Volpin, and Zingales, 2000) and its considerable research efforts to catch up with radial technology (Scalera, Mukherjee, Perri, and Mudambi, 2014) .
According to Ito and Rose (2002) , the five major oligopolists (Goodyear, Bridgestone, Michelin, Continental, and Pirelli) took up more than 75% of the global market share as a result of the late1980s consolidation.
The Tire Industry Since the 1990s: Relaxed Oligopoly and Design Patents
Starting in the 1990s, the tire industry witnessed another round of global competition, this time from emerging market makers. The once ever-strengthening oligopoly gradually relaxed, allowing mid-tier tire makers to take larger shares. According to Nikkei Asian Review (2015) Coincidently, while emergent mid-tier manufacturers were gaining more market share, dominant established players were filing more design patents. Specifically, the patent trajectory in the tire industry changed to protect more tread patterns starting in the 1990s. Tread design refers to the pattern or grooves on the tire's circumference and determines the effectiveness of traction, anti-hydroplaning, and noise-reduction, which critically influence a car's maneuverability and longevity (Clark, 1981) . Furthermore, since the tread design is unique for each tire brand, it gives a way for automobile makers who well understand the criticality of tread design for tire performance to recognize and select OE tires. In this sense, tread design is a valuable source of competitive advantage.
A few studies have noted the historical increase in protection of tire design. Scalera, "cosmetic" ornaments (Warner, 1966) , the recent specific focus on tread design is even more out of the traditional patent trajectory in the industry. Indeed, design patents for tread patterns were rare but are now the norm.
Why was protection of tread design weak before the 1990s? Various other resources at risk of imitation may explain the loose investment in inimitability. First, imitation might have destroyed the mutual benefits that the tire makers headquartered in the Akron area enjoyed.
Akron-based tire makers such as Goodyear, Goodrich, Uniroyal, Firestone, and General Tire had been collocated from the early days of the industry, developing a strong sense of trust. Allen (1949) reports that they "did not worry too much about patents and trade secrets," collectively "pooling ideas" and building improvements based on each other's innovations. This reciprocallybenefitting "open door policy" facilitated the atmosphere of active joint R&D projects among Akron-based tire makers (O'Reilly, 1983; Blackford and Kerr, 1996) . These players had little motive to hurt this special relationship of mutual benefits by infringing the intellectual properties of their trusted "friends."
Second, imitation may compromise the reputation of being an innovator, a critical resource to maintain OE market shares. Automobile makers, who are the buyers with the biggest bargaining power, relentlessly pushed tire makers to be technological innovators. To keep up with the evolving performance of cars, being an innovator is an important requirement to be selected for an OE tire supplier (Rajan, Volpin, & Zingales, 2000 (Rajan, Volpin, & Zingales, 2000) . Imitation can go against the strategic choice of tire makers.
The nature of design further restricts imitation by major tire makers. Since each tread pattern is uniquely identifiable to its brand and maker, the infringement of design cannot be easily hidden. Since the advanced players from Europe, the US, and Japan have created wellestablished tread patterns that are uniquely identifiable with their brands, they have not risked copying each other's designs to sacrifice competitive resources such as their reputation and brand identity.
These contextual circumstances along with the nature of design explain the loose protection of tread patterns without costly legal protection methods until the 1990s. When only advanced players competed in the global tire market, design infringement was hardly imaginable due to the other resources at stake.
However, a threat of imitation from emerging market tire makers finally arrived in the global tire industry. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, tire makers from South Korea made a major entry into the global market. For example, Kumho Tire entered the US OE Market for GM in 1988, and Hankook Tire did so for Volkswagen in 1991. This was a critical moment because of the significance of the OE market. According to Isaacson (1993) , a significant portion of OE tires transfer to the choice of individual replacement tire (RE) customers. Interviewees from a major tire maker called this "the rebound effect," which creates a significant portion of RE sales.
Isaacson (1993) reports that 44% of Michelin's OE tires were selected again when customers needed a new RE tire; Goodyear enjoyed a 39% rebound effect. For the first time in the global 16 tire industry, South Korean tire makers started to directly compete with long-dominating players from Europe, Japan, and the US by officially entering the OE market.
The emergence of emerging economy makers in the 1990s signaled the imminent threat of imitation to the advanced market players in the tire industry. Firms from emerging economies with weak IP protection tend to engage in IP infringement because of institutional (Khanna and Palepu, 1997) , cultural (Bugbee, 1967; Jaffe and Lerner, 2007) , and political (Zimmerman, 2013) loopholes. This tendency posed a practical threat of imitation for the tread patterns of advanced makers, which had not been protected for a long time (Warner, 1966) . Since players from emerging economies tend to have no or weak brand identity, they do not have much to lose when copying the tread designs of leading, established firms. Design infringement may not necessarily cost the emerging tire makers significantly because they do not carry the reputation of being innovators (Rajan, Volpin, & Zingales, 2000) or managers' views of imitation as taboo (Bolton, 1993; Shenkar, 2010) . They are even free from the risks to mutual benefits and the potential "delegitimization" (Meyer & Rowan, 1977 ) that had been supported by the open door policy of the Akron-based makers (Allen, 1949) . We argue that the emerging economy players' low cost of imitation contributed to the major tire makers' decision to begin protecting tread designs more strongly.
The increasing number of lawsuits related to tread design infringement starting in the late 1990s indirectly supports that the sudden increase in design patenting is not a vain worry. In 1996, Michelin claimed that a Korean tire maker, Kumho, had copied its tread design (Miller, 1996) on three tire models (XZA-1, XZA+1, and XZA2) protected by its US Patent No.
4,480,671. Kumho's tire, named 962 steer tire, was said to imitate Michelin's "narrow shoulder rib configuration" which the patent seeks to protect (Miller, 1996 Sherkin. This was the third lawsuit related to Aeolus Tire (Aeolus) in China. The suit claimed that Dynamic Tire distributed "knock-offs" of Michelin tires manufactured by Aeolus.
Specifically, Michelin claimed that its proprietary tread designs of XDE M/S and XDA-HT tires
were closely copied and infringed. The spokesperson for Michelin, Lynn Mann, stated that "the three separate lawsuits from last June to December shows how aggressively we're willing to pursue distributors that sell knockoffs of our tires. … From a Michelin North America standpoint, filing actions against the distributor is the most direct path to stopping this problem" (Nguyen, 2005) . Also in 2005, Michelin alerted its more than 5,000 dealers about many "lookalike tires from Asia," copying the tread design of its truck and off-the-road (OTR) tires. The long-time tire maker argued that such imitations cannot secure "the same grip or longevity of performance as an authentic Michelin tire" (Modern Tire Dealer, 2007).
Michelin recently filed a lawsuit against a Thailand-based tire maker, Svizz-One, and an American distributor, Atturo, for tread design infringement (US Patent No. D483,322) (Powell, 2016) , stating that the infringement "irreparably harms it [Michelin], for example, by circumventing its right to exclude others from making or selling products that are covered by the 18 tire tread patent." Michelin also added that the patent infringement should be considered as a willful act from an emergent tire maker "because it occurs despite an objectively high likelihood that their conduct infringes the patent" (Powell, 2016; Michelin v. Atturo and Svizz-One, 2016 issued "a limited exclusion order forbidding the import and sale of tires that violate Toyo's patents" (Kossov, 2014 ).
Bridgestone secured a favorable ruling in 2011 against two Chinese tire makers, Jianxin and PT Beststone. The Chinese makers were accused of "manufacturing and selling pre-cured treads" 3 copying Bridgestone's tread patterns for truck and bus tires (Bridgestone, 2014) . In 2014, the Zhengzhou Higher People's Court in China ruled that the two Chinese tire makers violated Bridgestone's design rights and ordered the makers to compensate the incurred damage to Bridgestone. After a few more lawsuits against tread design infringements, 19 stated that it will continue to deal with such infringement to protect "the safety and quality associated with its products … [for] maintaining and enhancing its hard-earned brand value".
Major Findings
Figure 1 Goodyear patented 2,127 designs, which is 2.6 times more than Michelin (817), and 1.6 times more than Bridgestone (1292) as of 2014. The average yearly production of design patents assigned to Goodyear jumped to 44.6 in 1990 -1994, 85 in 1995 -1999, and The main independent variable is the yearly revenue of Korean tire makers to show the impact of the emergence of Korean makers in the global tire market. We also included a variable for the yearly revenue of knock-off tire makers. We define the variable by summating the yearly revenues of tire makers that do not have any patent or license while still manufacturing tires as a proxy of imitators. The yearly number of utility patents controls the R&D intensity for each firm.
We also include various control variables for yearly revenues of each maker, the Great Recession period (2007 -2009) , the end of the Klepperian Oligopoly (1975 -1990 , Klepper and Simons, 2000 and the yearly number of lawsuit cases about the tread design infringements.
Notably, we use a control variable to incorporate the change in the strength of IP regime.
As a home country of a tire maker adopts a global IP protection standard, the maker's patenting (Peng, Ahlstrom, Carraher, & Shi, 2017; Brandl, Darendeli, and Mudambi, 2018, Forthcoming) .
The results of the main regressions can be found in Table 2 . We examine the relationship of design patents with the global revenues of Korean tire makers and find that the protection of designs is strongly and positively associated with the global revenues of the Korean players.
Along with the control variables in Model 5, the positive and significant estimates for Korean makers (p < 0.001) indicate that growth in Korean makers' revenues enhances their efforts to protect their designs. Since Korean tire makers emerged in the OE market where only advanced players had competed, their impact on design protection is significant as expected. On the other hand, the revenue growth of knock-off makers, who generally remain in the RE market, do not influence the trajectory of design patenting.
To further test the impact of Korean tire makers on specific strategic groups, we performed a subgroup analysis to better understand the threat of imitation across the different groups in context (Venkatraman, 1989) . We divided the dataset into two sets of subgroups:
advanced and emerging economy players. We defined the advanced players as traditional tire makers that have dominated both OE and RE markets in the global tire industry. This subgroup includes tire makers from the US, France, Italy, Japan, and Finland. The group of emerging players includes other makers from developing economies such as China, Indonesia, Taiwan, India, Pakistan, Poland, South Korea, Kenya, Peru, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, Myanmar, and Russia. For each group, we regressed the number of design patents on the revenue of Korean tire makers and control variables. The results in Table 3 show that the effect of growth in the revenues of Korean makers is not significant on the emerging players but is significantly positive 24 (p < 0.05) on the advanced players. The impact of the threat of imitation by Korean makers only affects the advanced players in the same strategic group, as expected.
We also performed a sensitivity analysis to better understand the impact of Korean tire makers as the major threat of imitation. We split the dataset before and after 1993, the year after all the Korean tire makers entered the US, which is the biggest tire market in the world. The results in Table 3 confirm that the effects of Korean makers' revenues after 1993 are significantly greater (p < 0.05) in magnitude than those before 1993. The analysis before/after 1995 is also consistent with the finding. The results show that the entry by Korean makers generated a greater impact on the production of design patents, implicating how seriously tire makers responded to the entry by Korean makers.
In summary, we argue that the main source of the big players' dramatic shift to design patents is the threat of imitation by emerging economy players such as South Korean tire makers.
While the trust among competitors in terms of protecting tread patterns and brand identity reduced the need to patent designs until the 1990s, the fear of emergent makers' attempts to imitate the design of advanced tire makers contributed to the phenomenon of filing more design patents. This threat of imitation from South Korea directly challenged and clearly impacted the group of advanced tire makers. This explains the situation shown in Figure 1 and Table 1 in which the pace of protection in tread designs becomes faster and the proportional share of tread designs relative to utility patents becomes larger.
Discussion and Conclusion
This study contributes to the international innovation literature in which the strategic management and international business disciplines intersect by sketching the dynamic imitator such as brand identity, innovators may leave some intellectual properties unprotected because they understand that the high cost of imitation prevents imitation. In this sense, the investment in inimitability is not an inevitable strategic choice of innovators. However, once this condition is compromised, isolating mechanisms finally draw managers' attention to securing inimitability.
One alternative explanation for the swift change in patent trajectory is the shift in R&D focus by advanced players. If advanced tire makers realized the value of tread design and started to focus on design over other types of innovations during the 1990s, the surge of design patenting may be explained. However, this possibility is slim because the value of tread designs has been widely known from the early years of the industry.
Since the first tread designs in 1908 by Goodyear and Firestone, the importance of tread design has been a key area of innovation (Lief, 1951; O'Reilly, 1983) . Tread design is uniquely identifiable to each brand and maker and is directly associated with financial performance (Lief, 1951) . For example, individual customers and automobile tire makers responded to Firestone's non-skid tire with its unique tread design quickly and positively; 40% of the 105,000 Firestone tires sold in 1909 and 60% of 168,000 units in 1910 were the anti-skid tire, leading to a profit of more than one million dollars (Leif, 1951) . This is mainly because tread design is one of the most critical determinants for tire quality. For instance, Allbert and Walker (1965) compared various factors that influence effective braking friction on a wet road. They found that while the change in tread materials only shows a variability of 1.5:1, patterned tire versus smooth tire creates a variability of 8:1 and different tread pattern designs do so up to 4:1. It is no wonder that researchers and tire makers have studied different shapes and depths of tread design elements in terms of pneumatic tire mechanics to minimize hydroplaning and maximize snow traction performance from the early period of the tire industry (Allbert and Walker, 1965; Novopolskii and Tretyakov, 1963; Smith and Dough, 1972; Staughton, 1970) . Thus, a sudden technological shift of focus on innovation in the 1990s does not fully explain the surge of design patents.
In conclusion, we argue that the main culprit for this surge is the change in the competitive landscape caused by emergent players with low imitation costs. A switch to a different patenting behavior in an innovation-driven industry may not simply occur out of a sudden recognition of the value of a specific type of innovation. It should be apprehended within the historical context of a dynamic competitive landscape. We contend that this change in patent trajectory should be appreciated in light of innovators' response to the threat of imitation, a threat that aims specifically at valuable but less protected intellectual properties. A formal or informal 27 protection mechanism for securing the economic rents from innovation (Teece, 1986 ) may be employed when the protection finally becomes necessary.
Limitations and Future Research Directions
First and foremost, a simple count of different types of patents may not fully capture the trajectory of protection and innovation (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004) , possibly requiring us to develop other measurements that may better fit the impact of imitation.
Due to the nature of an in-depth study within a single industry context, limited generalizability is another major limitation. Future research may be benefited by longitudinal studies clustering relevant industries. In particular, the extant literature tells us that some industries have no or gradual (rather than dramatic) shakeouts caused by innovation (Gort and Klepper, 1982; Klepper and Graddy, 1990; Klepper and Simons, 2000) . These different contexts of competition may react differently with the threat of imitation, resulting in different speed, strength, and direction of response to the threat. Understanding the sources of the institutional differences related to imitation can be another interesting research avenue to pursue.
Some follow-up research questions regarding imitation and its impact on innovation are presented to guide future researchers:
-Does infringement on design patents by emergent manufacturers influence the scope and quality of design innovation by advanced manufacturers?
-If so, how can such a relationship between patent infringement and innovation characteristics be theoretically apprehended and modeled? 
